Controlling Health Care Costs Through Commercial Insurance Companies by Holzgraefe, John Richard
CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS
THROUGH COMMERCIAL INSURANCE
COMPANIES
Commercial insurance companies' have the market incentives and
the ability to take on a new role as controllers of rising health care
costs. This Note will discuss the market for insurer-directed cost con-
tainment, the types of cost control alternatives that could be utilized
and the legal restraints on insurer innovation. The analysis of the legal
setting for insurer innovation in cost control includes an exploration of
rules governing the corporate practice of medicine, the physician-pa-
tient relationship, Blue Shield laws, specific mandatory policy provi-
sions and coverages, judicial extension of coverages, the effect of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) on employee
health insurance plans, and antitrust implications of insurer innova-
tion.
I. THE MARKET FOR INSURER-SPONSORED COST CONTAINMENT
A. Historical Reluctance to Assume an Active Role.
Consumers of health care, though increasingly concerned with ris-
ing costs, have not faced the fact that cost reduction requires a corre-
sponding reduction in the resources that are expended by the health
care industry. Two major factors have prevented consumers from con-
fronting this elementary trade-off: the predominance of the third party
payment system2 and an increasing level of consumer expectation in
health care The third party payment system has insulated the health
care cost decisions of consumers, preventing them from recognizing the
need to set utilization priorities.' Consumers want their health services
1. This Note will not consider Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, independent plans and the
government as insurance providers. It will focus upon commercial health insurers, since they are
private entities which currently provide financing as third party payors and should be influenced
by the profit motive. Approximately one thousand commercial insurers write group and individ-
ual health insurance policies covering 115 million persons for hospital care in the United States.
SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, NATIONAL HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE RESOURCE BOOK 64-65 (1976).
2. Havighurst, Controlling Health Care Costs: Strengthening the Private Sector'r Hand, I J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y AND L. 471,474-75 (1977).
3. E. BURNS, HEALTH SERVICES FOR TOMORRow-TRENDS AND ISSUES 1-3 (1973).
4. The normal market forces have not been able to control costs in the health care sector
because there is no party primarily interested in cost control. The provider of the services (sup-
ply) determines to a great extent which services the patient needs (demand); the provider is only
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to be provided at more reasonable rates, but at the same time they ex-
pect to fully benefit from all advances in health technology and to be
given comprehensive treatment.'
As a result of these inconsistent demands, the desire for insurer-
sponsored cost control may be outweighed by the expectation of com-
prehensive benefit packages, especially where the full cost conse-
quences of the trade-off are not evident. Although increasing medical
costs are reflected in the higher insurance premium for comprehensive
coverages, the insurer is playing against a "stacked deck" in trying to
market cost containment when someone other than the consumer bears
most or all of the premium.' The net evaluation of these incongruous
consumer expectations has resulted in the reluctance of insurers to take
the marketing risks associated with providing a product designed to
satisfy untested consumer demands that appear contrary to known con-
sumer desires.
Besides these inconsistent consumer demands, another influence
that has lessened the attractiveness of cost containment by insurers is
the structure of the tax laws. The tax treatment of health insurance
premiums encourages employers and employees to use untaxed dollars
to purchase group insurance having low deductibles.7 This accessible
and inviting market for first dollar coverage has provided no real in-
centive to innovate with seemingly less attractive coverages.
minimally constrained by normal market pressures since the third party payor bears much of the
cost of the purchase decision. The cost-reimbursement or cost-plus third party payment systems
provide natural incentives for price escalation. The health care delivery and finance system has
become structured with incentives that are insulated from, and often contrary to, those found in a
competitive market. See McClure, The Medical Care System Under National Health Insurance:
Four Models, I J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y AND L. 22, 32-36 (1976); Inflation of Health Care Costs:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 796 (1976) (statement of the Health Ins. Ass'n of America). The insured con-
sumer is also not faced with the full costs of a medical care purchase decision; instead of balancing
out-of-pocket costs against the benefits of health services, he is now faced with calculating how
much his insurance will cover. Thus, insurance becomes an incentive to overutilize available
health care services, resulting in a misallocation of resources in our economy and an artificially
high equilibrium in the market for health care. See Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping with Quali-
ty/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6, 9-20 (1975).
5. See Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 4, at 20-25; McClure, supra note 4, at 23. The
combined effects of insurance and high consumer expectation compound the problem. An in-
sured consumer is naturally influenced by the attitude that, having paid the cost of the insurance,
he should receive the most benefit from it. This attitude is reinforced by and further reinforces
the general public attitude that one should not try to economize when one's health is at stake and
leads the insured consumer to demand the best possible health care available.
6. The predominance of standard health insurance coverages in many employee benefit
packages may prevent employees from making any real cost/benefit decision.
7. Feldstein, How Tax Laws FuelHospital Costs, 3 PRisM No. 12, at 15 (Jan. 1976); Havig-
hurst, supra note 2, at 475-78.
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Another factor that has deterred insurers from entering the market
for cost containment is the hostility that such an entry is likely to elicit
from the medical profession. The possibility of alienating the medical
profession through insurer-inspired cost containment is far from imagi-
nary. Outside interference can prompt responses from the medical
profession that threaten the continued existence of the insurer as a busi-
ness entity.' A provider, because of his position in the health care deliv-
ery system, has more contact with the consumer-patient than the
insurer does as third party payor. Thus, when the consumer of health
services is faced with a conflict between his provider and his insurer,
his resolution almost inevitably favors the provider. For example, if
the insurance company has indicated that it ordinarily considers three
X-rays sufficient for diagnosing a particular problem but the patient's
doctor recommends that six are necessary, the patient is most likely to
take the doctor's advice. Only if the consumer decides that the benefits
to him of remaining with his insurer are greater than or equal to the
benefits of maintaining his relationship with his provider will there be
any tendency to seek the services of another provider.9
Past insurer attempts to effect cost containment measures do not
present a favorable prospect for the innovative insurer. The experience
of hospital associations in Oregon during the first half of this century
provides a valuable insight."° These associations practiced contract
medicine, providing comprehensive medical and hospital care in return
for a fixed fee paid jointly by employer and employee." Even after
gradually switching to payment on a fee-for-service basis, these as-
sociations were active in cost containment through such practices as
requiring prior approval for surgery and reviewing medical fees . 2
As providers developed an alternative method to finance these
medical services via physician-controlled prepaid insurance plans, phy-
8. See text accompanying notes 10-17 infra.
9. In the case of an individual health policy, unless the monetary benefits are clearly evi-
dent and are sufficient to outweigh the value that the insured places on his relationship with his
physician, the insurer is likely to lose a customer. In the case of a group health policy, the insurer
stands in a slightly better position; it is the employer that will be choosing the insurer, a decision
which the employee is more likely to accept, especially if the employer is paying all of the pre-
mium. However, in such a case the employer will likely consider the reactions of employees who
might be faced with the prospect of changing physicians. Employee discontent will then weigh
heavily in the employer's benefit analysis in choosing an insurer.
10. See Goldberg & Greenberg, The Effect of Physscan-ControlledHealth Insurance: United
States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y AND L. 48 (1977).
11. Id. 50. The similarity to prepaid group practice should be apparent. Hospital associa-
tions were organized for profit, providing strong incentive to control costs.
12. Id. 51, 54. The monitoring of medical fees allowed the hospital associations to serve as
informed buyers of medical care. Since they were organized for profit, the natural market incen-
five to control costs existed.
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sicians began refusing to deal directly with the hospital associations by
not accepting direct payment. Instead they forced the associations to
pay the patient who then shouldered the liability of the medical bill.'3
This inconvenience, coupled with the attractive alternative of the phy-
sician-sponsored plans, caused many patients to change their financing
system. Faced with this declining market, the hospital associations
were forced to abandon their aggressive cost containment tactics and to
assume the more passive role of merely a financing mechanism.
14
A more recent example of the impact of threatened boycott is the
attempt by Aetna Life and Casualty Company to enforce its rate sched-
ule for medical services. The agreement with its policyholders stated
"that where (1) Aetna disallowed a portion of the fee for exceeding
prevailing limits, (2) attempts to resolve the difference with the doctor
had failed, (3) the patient refuses to pay the balance himself, and (4)
the doctor then sued him for it, Aetna would pay to defend the suit."15
When physicians became aware of this policy, they threatened a boy-
cott.16 Again, the pressure of threatened boycott caused the innovative
insurer to retreat from its cost control efforts. 7
Sluggish acceptance by consumers and adverse reaction by the
medical establishment have left insurers timid about innovation aimed
at cost containment. Each insurer is cautious, not wanting to be the
first in the pool after observing the chilling response its predecessors
have received.
B. The Incentives to Intervene.
Because an insurance company's lower cost product would give it
a competitive advantage over the higher priced conventional insurance
coverages, an insurer stands to gain financially if its cost control efforts
can be effectively marketed. Whether these cost containment efforts
can be marketed profitably depends upon the consumer acceptance of
less comprehensive insurance coverages. The possibility of successfully
marketing a cost containment package has been enhanced by the pres-
13. Id. 58-62. The physician-sponsored plans not only offered the patient additional cover-
ages not provided by hospital associations, but also did not disrupt the physician-patient relation-
ship. The inherent attractiveness of the physician-sponsored plans was enhanced by the
economic and noneconomic sanctions on noncooperating physicians that the plans provided.
Physicians had "nothing to lose and everything to gain" by becoming members.
14. Id. 61.
15. Rosenberg, He Challenged-Aetna's Hard-line Fee Policy-and Won, MED. ECON., Sept.
11, 1972, at 31.
16. Letters to the Editor, MED. ECON., Dec. 4, 1972, at 27-29.
17. Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 10, at 64-65.
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ent market environment.' 8 Inflation in health care costs has made it
probable that the government will intervene if the private sector does
not correct the problem itself. Further, the escalation in health care
and insurance costs has caused increased awareness among consumers
who are now demanding that some limits be placed on such escalation.
Finally, the prevalence of employer-purchased insurance, which has
traditionally insulated consumers from health care cost trade-offs, can
now provide a market for cost-conscious coverages and be used to edu-
cate consumers on the advantages of cost containment.
Both the medical profession and the insurance industry may find
themselves handcuffed by bureaucratic red tape and regulations if the
government should further intervene in the health care sector. Physi-
cians want neither the governmental control that would accompany na-
tional health insurance nor the problems encountered when working
within government-sponsored programs.1 9 Private insurers are also
wary of many of the proposals for national health insurance, not want-
ing to be omitted from any prospective scheme.2° If the government
assumes the role of the financing mechanism in any program of na-
tional health insurance, commercial insurers may find themselves
squeezed out of the market by their own inaction.2'
The escalation in health care costs reflected in higher insurance
costs has also made the soil more fertile for innovation. Consumers,
seeing the increased size of their medical bills and feeling direct eco-
nomic pressure when paying insurance premiums, are demanding that
some controls be placed on such rampant inflation. This consumer
demand for a new service, that of cost containment, provides a valuable
opportunity for insurers.22 No longer should the insurers view the mar-
ket as demanding an intermediary that only performs the financing
function; the market now seeks an intermediary that also can provide
18. In assessing the changes in the market environment, an insurer will not have to risk all
its resources to determine if a demand for such a plan exists. Business firms can effectively analyze
the market reaction to new products by test marketing, which allows a firm to gain information
from the "mini-market" reaction without having to risk additional resources of the business in a
full-scale effort. See P. KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 218-22 (3d ed. 1976).
19. See NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 39 (T. Fain, K. Plant, R. Milloy eds. 1977).
20. Id. 50. See Inflation ofHealth Care Costs.: Hearings supra note 4; Hanson, The Private
Insurance Industry and State Insurance Regulatory Activities as Alternatives to Federally Enacted
Comprehensive National Health Insurance Legislation, 6 TOL L. REv. 677 (1975).
21. The federal government has already entered the health insurance market through Medi-
care and Medicaid, and also provides financing in other insurance markets, such as crop insur-
ance. The areas of government involvement are the result of the private insurers being unwilling
to provide the needed financing.
22. The commercial insurer, still exposed to the marketplace incentives to control the cost of
its product, appears to be the most likely party in the system to provide cost control services.
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the cost control function. Some large corporate consumers of insur-
ance, dissatisfied with the cost control efforts of third party payors,
have already implemented their own financing systems for health care
costs, hoping to achieve more control over expenditures than that
which is provided by insurers.' While competition in the health insur-
ance market has driven down the percentage of the premium that goes
for administrative expenses,24 the inflationary spiral continues." Given
that administrative costs are a mere fraction of the overall premium,26
insurer efforts need to be redirected at reducing the portion of the pre-
mium paid out in benefits.2 Tired of the financial strain caused by
rising medical costs, the consumer will be more aware of the trade-offs
that must be made with alternatives in health protection and will be
more receptive to insurance plans that can meet his demand for cost
containment.
Insurer involvement in curbing health care costs may also be sold
to the public by working with those employers who are concerned
about the rising health care costs of their employee benefit plans.28 Em-
ployers not only share an interest in cost containment, but they are the
prime and immediate consumers of the insurer's product. Working in
the development of cost control plans, the insurer can create the market
23. See, eg., the self-insurance plan of Goodyear, 41 Fed. Reg. 40,309 (1976).
24. The percentage of the insurance premium that is retained by the commercial insurer in
group policies has decreased from 30 % in 1950 to 10 % in 1975. Inflation of Health Care Costs.:
Hearings, supra note 4, at 796. Similar reductions can be found in individual policies, although a
higher percentage of those premiums are used for administrative expenses since the efficiencies of
handling group policies are not present. Since administrative costs constitute only a small part of
the overall premium, efforts spent minimizing these costs will have little ultimate impact.
25. NATIONAL HEALTH INsURANcE, supra note 19, at 283-89.
26. See note 24 su.pra.
27. The high premium volume that occurs with conventional insurance coverages is one of
the disincentives in the health care system that has discouraged cost control. See note 4 supra.
The higher premiums associated with comprehensive coverage provide more revenue which the
insurer can use to cover expenses and achieve profits. However, if the insurer reduces the total
cost of its product, this could lead to an increase in its market share which in turn could help
maintain a sufficient total premium volume despite a decrease in the premiums from individual
policies. While the percentage of the policy premiums paid out in benefits would decrease and
the percentage of policy premium needed for expenses would increase, such increases would be
justified in light of the cost control service provided by the insurer.
28. Some employers may not be able to take advantage of insurer cost containment through
modified benefit packages because of union demands that currently prevent reductions in fringe
benefits. This should not, however, prevent concerned employers from evaluating alternative
health care expense plans with unions; both sides should be concerned with avoiding health insur-
ance plans that waste funds that might otherwise be used for wage increases or other employee
benefits. Unions themselves have been active in sponsoring some cost containment measures.
See, e.g., 41 Fed. Reg. 40,300-07, 40,315-23 (1976): United Storeworkers Union (prospective re-
view of elective surgery); International Ladies Garment Workers Union (leverage through volume
purchasing of prescription drugs); Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (Health
Management Organizations); United Mine Workers of America (claims review).
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for its product while the employer realizes monetary savings. Em-
ployee and union representatives must be included in the planning
stages, both to educate them about the advantages of cost containment
and to make the employer more receptive to such plans.
The educational process should not be halted at the managerial
level. To make cost containment efforts successful, the individuals
who are affected as patients in health care decisions should also under-
stand the benefits of such plans. Employees should be made aware
that successful cost containment efforts may result in such tangible ben-
efits as higher wages.29 Consumers can be taught the importance of
making individual cost/benefit trade-off decisions; restructuring the
health care delivery and financing system to allow the reinstatement of
individual decision making can be an important mechanism for aiding
cost containment.
II. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR COST CONTAINMENT
An evaluation of the means by which an insurer might take advan-
tage of the market opportunity and help curb the costs of health care
services reveals many alternative strategies that can avoid complete
government intervention. Various parties in the delivery system can
be responsible for cost containment. The range of possible delivery
systems can be conceptualized as a continuum with the simple cash-for-
service method of financing at one end and provider-sponsored prepay-
ment plans at the other. At these two extremes health costs are opti-
mally controlled, because at least one of the parties (either the cash
paying patient or the provider) is directly involved in utilization deci-
sions and has an interest in keeping costs down.30 Between these ex-
29. Any employer cutting back on health insurance coverages, even with the support of em-
ployee representatives, is very likely to have discontented employees due to the prevailing public
attitude concerning health care. See notes 4-5 supra and text accompanying notes 3-5 supra. To
help avoid this, an insurer could develop alternative group coverages, allowing the employee to
choose between more health benefits with lower wages or less comprehensive health benefits with
higher wages. Tax laws treat both employee benefits and wages as business deductions, I.R.C. §
162, so the method of employee benefits should not affect the employer's decision. From the
employee's standpoint, the additional wages would be included in gross income while the health
insurance benefits that reimburse him for medical expenses may be excluded from gross income.
I.R.C. § 105(b). The additional take home pay may still be enough to offset this drawback in the
employee's decision even though under current tax laws he can obtain more coverage through his
employer's plan than he can purchase with his after-tax pay. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
An additional incentive for the employee to purchase his own insurance is found under I.R.C. §
104(a)(3), which excludes from gross income amounts received for personal injuries or sickness
under policies that the individual himself has purchased. Note that this exclusion applies to all
amounts, not just the amounts which reimburse the employee as under I.R.C. § 105.
30. A cash system most closely resembles a traditional market, where the consumer demand
is a market force that controls the price of health care services. See McClure, supra note 4, at 40-
[Vol. 1978:728
Vol. 1978:728] CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE COSTS 735
tremes are other delivery systems, such as the closed-panel concept, 31
Health Care Alliances (HCAs)32 and Individual Practice Associations
(IPAs),33 through which an insurer can take a very active role in cost
control.
Whatever strategy an insurer might decide to pursue, policy provi-
sions are the major variables that the insurer can manipulate to achieve
its aims. While an insurer can adopt various strategies to implement a
cost control scheme, three basic approaches seem to be available:34 al-
tering amounts and types of policy benefits; implementing utilization
review mechanisms; and promoting variations in the financing and de-
livery systems. A successful plan will very likely combine more than
one of these approaches while attempting to overcome some of the lim-
itations of current practices aimed at cost containment.
The easiest policy provisions to alter are those defining policy ben-
efits. The insured and insurer are basically free to bargain concerning
the limitations on coverages; 35 significant cost reductions would accrue
through the use of higher deductibles, greater copayment percentages
and less comprehensiveness in the range of services covered.36 A de-
crease in first dollar coverages would be particularly effective in reduc-
41. Placing the burden of cost control on the provider is also effective, because it eliminates
unnecessary medical care. Note that under either alternative, the nonpaying party in the pro-
vider/consumer pairing will always have an incentive to spend, while the other (the paying party)
will always have an incentive to reduce spending. The potential conflict that may result from the
provider also performing the cost control function is open to criticism. While his professional
judgment may encourage further expenditure for health care treatment, his economic motives may
prevent such unrestrained professional judgment.
31. For a discussion of the closed panel and related legal issues, see Kallstrom, Health Care
Cost Control By Third Party Payors: Fee Schedules and the Sherman Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 645.
32. For a discussion of the basic structure of the HCA, see Reynolds, A New Scheme to Force
You to Competefor Patients, MED. ECON., Mar. 21, 1977, at 23.
33. For a discussion of the Individual Practice Association, see Edgahl, Taft, Friedland &
Linde, The Potential of Organizations of Fee-for-service Physiciansfor Achieving Signlcant De-
creases in Hospitalization, 186 ANNALS OF SURGERY No. 3, at 388 (Sept. 1977).
34. While these approaches are not mutually exclusive and are arbitrarily chosen to some
extent, this framework can allow an insurer to better analyze prospective strategies. For sugges-
tions as to specific strategies, see Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care
Financing, 1978 DUKE L. J. 303, 321-26.
35. While the insurance contract is considered a contract of adhesion, the parties can choose
the types of coverage, policy limits, deductible amounts and copayment percentages.
36. The deductible amount is the amount of expense which the insured incurs before his
insurance begins to pay. Cost sharing by the insured also occurs through copayment provisions,
under which the insurer and insured each pay a percentage of all expenses above the deductible
amount. Copayment provisions help maintain some cost consciousness in the insured, though to
a reduced extent. Under an 80-20 copayment scheme, the insured can receive a dollar's worth of
health services for only 20 cents. See generally W. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW §
18.6 (1972).
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ing the costs of the policy.3 7 Cost sharing revives cost consciousness in
the individual receiving medical treatment, since the individual is faced
with the full cost of the medical care falling within the deductible
amount. The types of health care services that are covered can also be
manipulated. The clear trend has been to increase the kinds of medi-
cal treatment for which the policy will pay.38 The resulting "cumulative
package," however, is one of the factors most responsible for the esca-
lation of health care costs.
The coordination-of-benefits provision in many policies has been
one successful measure designed to prevent an insured from being re-
imbursed more than once for medical expenses.39 Other measures, such
as providing coverage for pre-admission testing and out-patient care,
while designed to substitute less expensive forms of health care by
avoiding hospitalization, have had questionable effects on cost contain-
ment.40 These coverage extensions may be ineffective as cost control
measures unless accompanied by corresponding reductions in policy
coverages or benefits. Each additional benefit paid by the third party
removes one more marketplace decision from the consumer. Un-
checked by market forces, the continuing rise in medical costs must be
passed on in higher premiums. Limited coverage would reduce the
cost of insurance while at the same time subjecting certain health care
decisions to ordinary market forces.
Aside from altering amounts and types of coverages, a second ap-
proach is for the insurer to assume a more active role in monitoring
utilization. With respect to cost control procedures, insurers have used
variations of claims review to isolate cases of high fees.41 An inherent
37. See H. Diprete, Third Party Influences in Benefit Plan Design (June 3, 1977) (back-
ground paper for June 3-4, 1977 conference by Boston University Program on Public Policy for
Quality Health Care) (describing various coverage plans yielding from 5% to 50% premium reduc-
tions).
38. Policy coverage has expanded both by reducing the amount of cost sharing by the in-
sured and by increasing the types of benefits provided, such as dental care, prescription drugs and
psychological treatment.
39. See Berman v. Group Health Ass'n, 316 A.2d 863 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842
(1974) (upholding the validity of a coordination-of-benefits provision in a group policy); W.
MEYER, supra note 36, §§ 18.10-.16.
40. See A. DONABEDIAN, BENEFITS IN MEDICAL CARE PROGRAMS 148-200 (1976). Studies
examining the effect of out-patient benefits and hospital use have been largely inconclusive. Some
have reflected an overall increase in total charges, id 157, others have shown a savings in hospital
use, id 163, while still others have shown no significant relationship between the two, id 164. A
greater reduction in hospital use appears to be the result of a restructured delivery system accom-
panying the extended benefits, under which the physician is freed from many of the current incen-
tives which promote hospital care. Id 173. Where home care is also covered in the benefit
package, a clear increase in oVerall cost has resulted. Id 178-79.
41. C. MoRRow, HEALTH CARE GUIDANCE: COMMERCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE AND NA-
TIONAL POLICY 43-47 (1976). See text accompanying notes 10-17 supra.
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limitation of many forms of this approach is that after high fees have
been isolated such cases are referred to review committees whose mem-
bership largely consists of other physicians.42 While members of the
medical profession are the most qualified to evaluate the services per-
formed by a fellow physician, there is serious doubt as to whether they
are efficacious as cost watchdogs.43 Allowing reimbursement for second
and third opinions prior to elective surgery is another coverage modifi-
cation that promotes utilization review.' This change has at least be-
gun to curb the problem of unnecessary surgery and defensive
medicine. However, unless as an enforcement mechanism a third
opinion is made binding in cases of inconsistent prior opinions, many
of the same incentives in the system remain to encourage the insured to
proceed with the operation.45
The third area in which insurer innovations might occur involves
the development of variations in the financing and delivery systems for
health care services. Through policy coverages, insurers can also pro-
mote various delivery systems by requiring an insured to receive his
medical services from a certain group of providers operating in a closed
panel.46 Alternatively, plans can be structured using a fixed indemnity
with the insurer designating physicians who will accept the insurer's
reimbursement as full payment. This type of plan would still provide
the insured with the option of choosing his own physician and paying
out of his own pocket any difference in charges. A plan that provides a
fixed indemnity for types of treatment regardless of the cost to the in-
sured would encourage the insured to help control costs by finding the
health care services he wants at lower costs, allowing the insured to
retain any savings.47 Insurers have also been active in providing
42. Inflation of Health Care Costs: Hearings, supra note 4, at 798.
43. Some cost savings have occurred even with this system of control. Id. One may still
question what additional savings might have been achieved if the ifiterplay of market forces had
been allowed to function originally through third party payors acting as informed buyers of the
health care.
44. See National Health Insurance, Major Issues Vol III Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health andthe Environment of the House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 832 (1976) (statement of Robert Van Hoek, M.D.).
45. See text accompanying notes 2-5 supra.
46. For a discussion of the legality of the closed-panel system, see Kallstrom, supra note 31.
47. The tax implications of such a plan again tend to reduce the incentive to economize.
Under employer-funded insurance, any excess of the fixed indemnity above the actual expenditure
for health services by the insured must be reported as income of the insured, since these amounts
are in excess of those needed to reimburse the insured for medical expenses which he has incurred.
SeeI.R.C. § 105(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.105-2 (1956). An employer contributing to such a plan would
still be allowed a business deduction under I.R.C. § 162(a). See [1978] 1 FED. TAX GUIDE (CCH)
2171. Where the employee pays the policy premium, however, the above limitation does not
apply. I.R.C. § 104(a)(3). See note 29 supra.
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financial support for Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) and
other delivery systems, thus even more directly subsidizing alternative
methods of health care delivery.4"
III. LEGAL OBSTACLES TO INSURER INNOVATIONS IN COST
CONTROL4 9
A. Corporate Practice of Medicine and Interference with the
Physician-Patient Relationsho.
One factor that must be considered in nearly any attempt by an
insurer to contain costs is the general rule proscribing the practice of
medicine in the corporate form. Any attempt by an insurer to employ
a closed panel of physicians or to impose cost controls through second
opinions is likely to be challenged under this doctrine. The rule is
founded on the idea that acts of natural persons employed by the cor-
poration are attributable to the "corporate person."50 Since the incor-
poreal legal entity has "neither education, nor skill, nor ethics," the
argument goes, the public should not be exposed to the dangers inher-
ent in services provided by the corporation.-" While one of the major
purposes of the concept was to protect the public from quackery, de-
ception and commercial exploitation, another reason for its invocation
has been to prevent lay interference with the physician-patient relation-
ship.52
Two basic theories exist in which to couch the illegality of corpo-
rate practice. According to one theory, corporate practice is a violation
of the medical licensing acts, the statutes that require a person to be
licensed before practicing medicine.53 The other theory finds corporate
practice a violation of public policy-an elastic rationale that can be
stretched to include protection against the dangers of lay control over
professional judgment,54 the commercial exploitation of medical prac-
48. Inflation of Health Care Costs: Hearings, supra note 4, at 799, 812, 823-27.
49. Different approaches to insurer innovation will encounter different legal challenges.
Each state's laws must be analyzed for actual conflicts with the proposed activity by insurers.
This section will attempt to identify and analyze some of the possible challenges common to
various plans of cost containment.
50. 19 CJ.S. Corporations § 956 (1940).
51. State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 785, 234 N.W. 260, 262 (1931).
52. Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 887, 961 (1971). For an excellent discussion of the history and implications of the corpo-
rate practice of medicine, see Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 432 (1960). See also Laufer, Ethical and Legal Restrictions on Contract and Corporate
Practice of Medicine, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 516 (1939).
53. See People v. United Medical Serv., 362 IM. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).
54. See State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P.2d 429
(1938), cert. denied 306 U.S. 633 (1939).
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tice, 5 a decrease in professional standards, 6 and the division of the
practitioner's loyalty between patient and profit-making employer.57
Each of these theories could present problems to market innovations.
One commentator, however, has concluded that an examination of
the state medical licensing acts often reveals that corporations were not
intended to be included as "persons" under these statutes and, hence,
were not intended to be excluded from the practice of medicine.58 One
must then turn to the judicially imposed public policy restraints that
are designed for the protection of the public; the arguments raised in
support of such restraints should be continually reevaluated to assure
that the dangers which they seek to avoid are not imaginary.
If the rationales favoring the restraints are no longer as strong as
those against them, the courts should not hesitate to remove these judi-
cially erected barriers. Most of the public policy arguments against
corporate practice are predicated on the notion that it would adversely
affect the physician-patient relationship. 9 This type of argument as-
sumes that corporate practice will necessarily entail an employer-em-
ployee relationship between the doctor and the corporation and that
such a relationship creates an inherent conflict of interest for the doc-
tor. However, employer-employee relationships currently exist be-
tween corporations and licensed physicians that have not been found to
constitute the corporate practice of medicine.60 Courts have been par-
ticularly flexible in finding an independent contractor relationship in
cases involving nonprofit corporations, recognizing that the public pol-
icy considerations were not applicable. 61 A different result, however,
seems to be reached where profit-making entities are involved.62 In
55. See Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932).
56. See State v. Boren, 36 Wash. 2d 522, 219 P.2d 566 (1950).
57. See Silver v. Lansburgh & Bros., 111 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
58. Willcox, supra note 52, at 437-42.
59. The importance of this relationship has been explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court
in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973); and United
States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952).
60. Some of the numerous examples include hospital residents, radiologists, pathologists and
salaried clinical physicians. Courts have at times applied a different standard as to what consti-
tutes an employment relationship when dealing with the corporate practice rule than when deal-
ing with other areas of the law. Wilcox, supra note 52, at 450-53.
61. See, e.g., Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1938), afj'd on other
grounds sub nomt Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Los Angeles
County v. Ford, 121 Cal. App. 2d 407, 263 P.2d 638 (1953). In both cases the courts rejected
charges of corporate practice, pointing out that the dangers of commercialization did not exist.
62. See, e.g., State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P.2d
429 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App.
2d 592, 52 P.2d 992 (1935).
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State Board ofMedical Examiners v. Pacyc Health Corp.,63 the defend-
ant was a for-profit corporation that offered medical services to the
public through a panel of physicians with whom it had contracted. Pa-
cific Health Corporation, in turn, had contracted to provide medical
services to members who had paid for this service. When a contract
holder suffered injury or illness, the corporation directed the holder to
a particular health-care provider. The physicians were neither salaried
nor directed by the corporation, but were compensated according to
actual services rendered. Despite what appeared to be an independent
contractor relationship between the corporation and the physician, the
majority of a divided California Supreme Court would not permit the
"policy of the law [to] be circumvented by technical distinctions in the
manner which the doctors are engaged, designated or compensated by
the corporation."'  The per curiam opinion justified the holding on
policy reasons:
The evils of divided loyalty and impaired confidence would seem to
be equally present whether the doctor received benefits from the cor-
poration in the form of salary or fees. And freedom of choice is
destroyed, and the elements of solicitation of medical business and
lay control of the profession are present whenever the corporation
seeks such business from the general public and turns it over to a
special group of doctors.6 5
Three justices strongly dissented, finding neither a violation of the
medical practice statute nor the contravention of public policy. They
found nothing to indicate that the corporation either directly or indi-
rectly supervised the doctors in the professional services rendered to
member-patients.66
The majority was also forced to account for the apparent legality
of other corporations that furnish medical services. It distinguished
such practice on the grounds that the services were provided to a partic-
ular association or group of employees, that they did not involve the
solicitation of the public and that most cases involved nonprofit entities
in which physicians were not exploited for the benefit of shareholders.67
The profit/nonprofit distinction is too imprecise a rule upon which
to rest the future of corporate practice of medicine.6 8 The real issue is
the degree to which a corporation interferes with the physician's profes-
63. 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P.2d 429 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939).
64. 12 Cal. 2d at 158, 82 P.2d at 430.
65. Id. at 158-59, 82 P.2d at 430.
66. Id. at 163, 82 P.2d at 432.
67. Id. at 160, 82 P.2d at 431.
68. Note, supra note 52, at 962. Physicians themselves are not immune from the profit mo-
tive. See Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Marketfor Health Services, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 716, 753 (1970); McClure, supra note 4, at 33.
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sional judgment. This should be a qualitative test, focusing upon the
nature of the control rather than upon the number of interconnections
existing between the corporation and the physician.
So long as unfettered professional judgment governs decisions on
medical care, it should not matter that the care is delivered under the
auspices of a corporation.69 It follows that if the duties performed by
the corporate entity are administrative rather than diagnostic, the ar-
rangement should not violate the policies prohibiting corporate prac-
tice.70 The "commercialization" sought to be avoided is the type that
would have negative results on the physician-patient relationship. 7' If
the precautions built into a delivery system can prevent this adverse
impact, no public policy rationale justifies a holding that an alternative
mechanism for cost containment is illegal merely because it is spon-
sored by a corporation.72
Policy provisions which limit insurance coverage may also be chal-
lenged as interfering with the physician-patient relationship or as re-
stricting the physician's right to practice medicine. Whether the
coverage eliminates reimbursement for some types of health care serv-
ices or requires the insured to receive treatment from specified provid-
ers, a consumer of health care or his provider may find some
limitations on his health care decisions. A distinction, however, must
be drawn between interfering with medical decisions and defining the
69. Note, supra note 52, at 962. But V' Bartron v. Codington County, 68 S.D. 309, 2
N.W.2d 337 (1942) (holding that despite a lack of interference with the physician-patient relation-
ship, to have a layman as a shareholder of a clinic was against public policy).
70. See State Electro-Medical Inst. v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078, (1905), where the
court distinguished between the functions a corporation may perform and those it may not:
It is impossible to conceive of an impersonal entity "judging the nature, character and
symptoms of the disease," or "determining theproper remedy," or giving or prescribing
the application of the remedy to the disease. Members of the corporation, or persons in
its employ, might do these things, but the corporation itself is incapable to do them. The
qualification of a medical practitioner is personal to himself. The intention of the law is
that one who undertakes to judge the nature of a disease, or to determine the proper
remedy therefor, or to apply the remedy, must have certain personal qualifications ....
Making contracts is not practicing medicine. Collecting the compensation therefor is
not practicing medicine . . . No professional qualifications are requisite for doing
these things.
Id. at 43, 103 N.W. at 1079.
71. It must be recognized, however, that the physician-patient relationship does not always
refer to a relationship that is free from the effects of operating efficiencies. Some clinics and
hospitals are designed to operate with the patient seeing a physician who is available at the time
rather than developing an ongoing relationship with a single physician. The practical difference
between this system and one operated by a corporation is slight.
72. For a discussion of benefits that might result from the corporate practice of medicine, see
J. LADoU & J. LIKENS, MEDICINE AND MONEY: PHYSICIANS AS BUSINESSMEN 129-43 (1977).
For an examination of the potential benefits of for-profit corporate delivery systems, see The Case
for For-Profit Health Mdaintenance Organizations, 15 STUDY ON LEOAL ISSUES IN THE REORO. OF
HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS (1972).
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extent of insurance coverage.73 The above illustrations are better char-
acterized as limited insurance coverages that the insured has volunta-
rily accepted or as coverages that are preconditions to the insured's
receiving reimbursement, rather than as interference by the insurer in
the professional judgment of the provider.
B. Blue Shield Laws.
Blue Shield statutes74 present another impediment to insurer inno-
vation. These statutory provisions normally mandate the domination of
the structure or operation of nonprofit health service corporations by
providers.75 They were supported by medical societies and were en-
acted to preserve physician control over the practice of medicine.7 6 In-
surers contemplating alternative delivery systems, such as prepaid
group practice, have been faced with the prospect of having to organize
under the state's Blue Shield statute and, as a result, succumb to the
control of the medical societies. Enforcement of these statutes, how-
ever, has not always been strict-health service plans have been able to
operate by using legal fictions and liberal interpretations of the law, or
even by disregarding the statutory language.77
Some relaxation of these restrictive laws has occurred due to the
Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973,78 which preempts some
restrictive state requirements if a prepaid group plan meets federal
standards. HMO-enabling legislation in more than half of the states
also has relaxed many of the prior restrictions. 79 However, not all types
of health service plans can be organized under these more liberal HMO
statutes. One problem is that some states still prohibit the organization
of the HMO as a for-profit corporation. 80 Those not qualifying are still
faced with the restrictive provisions contained in the Blue Shield laws.
Medical society control of Blue Shield-type plans may also be con-
stitutionally challenged by innovative insurers.81 Restrictive provisions
in state law have twice been struck down by the New Jersey Supreme
73. See Havighurst, supra note 2, at 496-97 n.62.
74. See, eg., MASS. ANN. LAWS chs. 176A-176C (Law. Co-op 1977).
75. Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 IowA L. REv. 209, 222-28 (1950).
76. Id. 225; Note, supra note 52, at 963. For a recent case challenging such a statute, see
Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
77. Note, supra note 52, at 964-69.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 300e (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-460, 90 Stat. 1945
(1976).
79. J. LADou & J. LIKENS, supra note 72, at 137-39.
80. Id.
81. See Comment, Prepayment Health Care Plan Enabling Acts-Are Their Restrictive Fea-
tures Constitutional?, 7 DUQUESNE L. REv. 125 (1968).
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Court.82 One provision of the law required medical society approval of
every director or trustee of the plan; another required the majority of
the eligible physicians within a county to belong to the plan at all times
before the plan could operate in the county. The court held that when,
as under Blue Shield statutes, an interested private body is given the
power to regulate the economic posture of another without sufficient
standards or safeguards, the statute is an unlawful delegation of au-
thority to a private group and a violation of due process.
83
C. Mandatory Policy Provisions and Coverages.
Insurers may attempt to inject cost consciousness into the health
care market by making alterations in the insurance policy itself, such as
raising deductibles, requiring heavier cost sharing by the insured
through higher copayment provisions, excluding certain medical treat-
ments, mandating the use of more nonprofessionals to provide services
and requiring greater use of ambulatory care. These types of changes,
however, may be barred by mandatory policy provisions in both indi-
vidual and group policies.8 4
The "payment of claims" provision is one example. It deals with
the method through which an insurer may discharge its liability under
the insurance contract. Part of this provision, mandatory in some
states8 5 and optional in others, 86 deals- with the question of to whom
payment can be made:
[A]U or a portion of any indemnities provided by this policy on ac-
count of hospital, nursing, medical or surgical services may, at the
insurer's option... be paid directly to the hospital or person render-
ing such services; but it is not required that the services be rendered
by a particular hospital or person. 7
Similarly, some state statutes require the same type of provision in
group health insurance policies, making the last clause even more ex-
82. Group Health Ins. of NJ. v. Howell, 43 NJ. 104,202 A.2d 689 (1964); Group Health Ins.
of N.J. v. Howell, 40 N.J. 436, 193 A.2d 103 (1963).
83. One ground for holding these provisions unconstitutional was that they were unreasona-
ble and arbitrary. This type of substantive due process review is unlikely to be successful except
in courts that have demonstrated a high degree ofjudicial activism. Comment, supra note 81, at
136. A more direct and decisive approach involves lobbying in the legislature to amend the re-
strictive provisions. Note, supra note 52, at 967-68.
84. More flexibility in mandatory provisions is found in group policies in order to ade-
quately tailor the coverage to meet the needs of the group. One reason for fewer restraints in
group plans is that normally an informed buyer is negotiating the contract for the group, needing
less protection than an uninformed individual purchaser.
85. See, ag., CAL. INS. CODE § 10350.9 (West 1972).
86. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-5-3(a)(9) (Bums 1975).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
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plicit: "but the policy may not require that the service be rendered by a
particular hospital or person."88 These statutory directives may present
obstacles to an insurer attempting to contain costs by using a closed
panel of physicians.
In a case involving this statutory construction, the court, in hold-
ing that an insurance policy did not provide coverage for medical care
rendered by a podiatrist, stated in dicta that the wording of the statute
was
statutory language of differentiation, by which policy designs that
would permit the insurer to direct the destiny of the cure through the
specific designation of the person or facilities, are prohibited ...
Therefore, [the statutes] serve to prohibit this selective and discre-
tionary designation of personnel for the treatment of the ill, rather
than to affirmatively require insurers to indemnify for all attempted
cures which are legally rendered. 9
While this statutory language would not allow the insurer to require its
insured to see a specific physician or be admitted at a specific facility,
the court's holding implies that the insurer may exclude some medical
care providers from its coverages. Such a holding is consistent with
the concept that the insured must comply with the conditions precedent
before collecting under the policy, one of which is receiving treatment
from a "covered" physician. It must be noted, however, that in this
case the distinction relied upon by the insurer resulted in denying reim-
bursement for services performed by a limited practice physician,90 a
podiatrist, while allowing reimbursement for services performed by a
physician licensed to practice general medicine. A more difficult case,
with possibly a different result in light of the court's dicta, is one in
which the insurer would deny reimbursement for treatment by some
physicians while providing reimbursement for treatment by physicians
of the same class. However, so long as the insured is not precluded
from some freedom in the choice of his physician, the contractual
agreement between the insurer and insured should not be read to vio-
late statutory requirements. From another perspective, since these
statutory provisions deal only with direct payment by the insurer to the
provider, they would not appear to affect situations in which the insurer
provides reimbursement or indemnity to the insured himself, since the
88. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-5-10(c) (Bums 1975) (emphasis added).
89. Insurance Comm'rs of Ind. v. Mutual Medical Ins., Inc., 251 Ind. 296, 303-04, 241
N.E.2d 56, 61 (1968).
90. Some states now require reimbursement for limited practice physicians when they per-
form services that would normally be covered by the insurance contract. See N.Y. INs. LAW §
221(5) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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insured maintains freedom in choosing his own physician. 91
In some states legal restraints prevent the insurer from limiting the
extent and types of coverages. Some of the greatest restrictions on this
type of insurer innovation exist in New York. There, all individual
policies must provide minimum benefits for hospital room and board
expenses, miscellaneous hospital expenses and surgical expenses. 92 In
an attempt to help contain costs, the legislature has also required that
the individual health insurance policies that provide in-patient hospital
benefits also provide coverage for out-patient benefits, emergency care,
pre-admission testing, second surgical opinions, qualified home care
and nursing home care.93 Both individual and group policies also re-
quire that the insurer reimburse the insured for certain treatments ren-
dered by qualified practitioners other than physicians.94 While most of
these measures are designed to avoid the high cost of hospital and over-
qualified professional care whenever possible, the impact of this type of
control has not always achieved the envisioned cost reductions.95
The legislative efforts to protect the consumer who receives these
new coverages also can have counterproductive effects on cost contain-
ment. These attempts often work to freeze part of the underlying sta-
tus quo and thus handcuff insurer innovation. An example is again
provided by New York's statute, which, while requiring coverage for
less costly home health care, prohibits coverage that contains more
than a fifty dollar deductible or lower than a seventy-five percent
copayment provision.96 By mandating additional types of minimum
coverages, the net effect of these statutes is to compound statutorily the
cumulative insurance package.
The Model Comprehensive Health Insurance and Health Care
Cost Containment Act includes some provisions that can aid in curbing
health care costs.97 Under the Model Act, every insurance carrier
would be required to affirmatively offer qualified comprehensive health
insurance, even though the purchaser still has the option of purchasing
less comprehensive coverages. Under either of the alternative deducti-
91. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
92. N.Y. INS. LAW § 164(2)(B)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976). See also NAIC MODEL INDIVID-
UAL ACCIDENT AND SICKNESS MINIMUM STANDARDS ACT, [1974] 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAIC
414.
93. N.Y. INS. LAW § 164(7-c)-(7-j) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
94. N.Y. INS. LAW § 164(7-a)-(7-d) (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1976), § 221(5)(b)-(e) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1976).
95. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
96. N.Y. INS. LAW § 164(7-f) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
97. NAIC MODEL COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE COST CON-
TAINMENT ACT, [1976] 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAIC 407.
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ble and copayment provisions of the Model Act, a two hundred dollar
minimum deductible per person per policy year, as well as a twenty
percent copayment provision for expenses above the deductible, must
be imposed for each of these policies.98 The Act would also require
insurers that provide coverage for expenses that would normally fall
within the deductible, copayment or exclusion provisions to issue a
"separate policy or endorsement containing a clear and separate disclo-
sure of the total amount of premium required to insure the specified
deductible, copayments or exclusions." 99 This requirement would bet-
ter allow the insurance purchaser to weigh the marginal benefits of this
first dollar coverage while still allowing free choice in the selection of
these coverages.
D. Judicial Extension of Policy Coverages.
Coverage limitations and modifications must also overcome the
obstacles of judicial interpretation that might attempt either to expand
policy coverages or strike down policy provisions as unconscionable.
Unequal bargaining power between the insurance company and the in-
sured has led many courts to extend the rights of policyholders beyond
those found in policy provisions." This is partly because an insurance
contract is usually one of adhesion; consequently, any provision will be
construed strictly against the insurer that drafted and issued it.'0' Some
decisions, moreover, have extended coverages beyond that allowed by
any ambiguity in the policy language to provide benefits that the in-
sured reasonably expected.10 2 One rationale for such extensions is that
the insurance policy is complex and not understandable to the layman
without extensive study. It may be possible, however, for the insurer
to avoid the problem of these "reasonable expectations" by giving the
insured notice of any change in policy coverages.10 3
Even if the insured is aware of policy limitations when contracting
for coverage, a court may disallow the literal enforcement of these limi-
tations if it considers them to be unconscionable. This usually occurs in
98. Id § 6(C), Alternatives I & II (amended at [1977] 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAIC 43-44).
99. NAIC MODEL COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH INSURANCE AND HEALTH CARE COST CON-
TAINMENT ACT § 6(C)(4), [1977] 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAIC 44.
100. See Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv.
961 (1970).
101. W. MEYER, supra note 36, § 2.5. The characteristics of contracts of adhesion, where
the contract is presented to the applicant who has limited ability to negotiate its terms, are less
likely to be found in larger group policies, where much negotiation occurs between the parties.
Id § 2.3.
102. Keeton, supra note 100, at 966-74.
103. See Fassio v. Montana Physicians' Service, 553 P.2d 998 (Mont. 1976); Poch v. Equita-
ble Life Assurance Soe'y, 343 Pa. 119, 22 A.2d 590 (1941).
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cases where enforcement of a policy provision would defeat the reason-
able expectations of the great majority of policyholders who are not
aware of the limitation or where restrictive definitions would not pro-
vide any coverage except in the extreme cases where the literal terms of
the policy are met." Where an insurer takes precautions to avoid such
a misunderstanding by fully explaining the extent and operation of
coverages to its insureds, limitations on coverages should be upheld
and the plain language of the policy effectuated unless such limitations
are unconscionable, illegal or against public policy. 05 Similarly, provi-
sions in contracts between employers and an insurer should also with-
stand challenge by the insured employees. The California Supreme
Court, for example, has sustained the validity of a provision in a medi-
cal services contract requiring arbitration of any malpractice claim by
the state's employees."
E. ERJSA Preemption of State Laws.
As one examines the state laws which may restrict an insurer's ef-
forts to contain costs, the implications of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) °7 come into question. Some state
laws governing medical benefits provided by employers for their em-
ployees have been preempted by this Act. Under ERISA, an "employee
welfare benefit plan" is defined as
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter es-
tablished or maintained by an employer or by an employee organiza-
tion, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its par-
ticipants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise,. . . medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits .... 108
Although the Act directly regulates only reporting, disclosure and
104. Keeton, supra note 100, at 974-77.
105. See National Hills Shopping Center, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 551 F.2d 655 (5th
Cir. 1977); Electron Mach. Corp. v. American Mercury Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1961);
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Snow, 222 F. Supp. 892 (D. Or.), a f'd sub nom. General Accident Fire &
Life Assurance Corp. v. Snow, 331 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1963). On the issue of unconscionability in
limiting coverages, a useful comparison can be made with proposals for no fault liability via con-
tract in malpractice and other areas. See O'Connell, No Fault Liability by Contract for Doctors,
Manufacturers, Retailers and Others, 632 INs. L.J. 531 (1975); O'Connell, An Elective No-Fault
Liabiliy Statute, 628 INs. L.J. 261 (1975). If legal challenges to elective no fault are to be resisted,
the party relieved of the liability must provide the other party with reasonable compensation. See
Havighurst, "MedicalAdversi y Insurance'--Has Its Time ComeZ 1975 DUKE L.J. 1233, 1276-77.
Similarly, the insurer can offer the insured reduced rates to justify reduced coverages.
106. Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882
(1976).
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (Supp. V 1975).
108. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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fiduciary duties with respect to employee welfare benefit plans,'0 9 it
also summarily preempts all state regulation of ERISA-covered em-
ployee benefit plans.'10 State laws regulating insurance are not subject
to ERISA preemption;"' however, Congress specifically forbade
classification of employee benefit plans as "insurance companies" and
thus made the plans subject to ERISA.1 2
The absolute preemption of state laws regulating such employee
benefit plans may leave the courts to develop a federal common law in
the unregulated areas according to the underlying principles of ER-
ISA. I 3 At least one court, however, has held that since the substantive
provisions of ERISA relating to health and accident insurance are the
reporting and disclosure requirements, the substance of insurance plans
that employers offer employees is not governed by ERISA." 4
F. Antitrust Implications.
In evaluating possible market strategies for providing cost contain-
ments, insurers must be aware of the antitrust restraints that may be
involved. While the McCarran Act specifically exempts the "business
of insurance" from federal antitrust laws to the extent that state laws
regulate such activities, 1 5 legal questions arise as to which insurer ac-
109. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1101 (Supp. V 1975); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp.
1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), a'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978); Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Hea-
ton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
110. Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D.
Ind.), modoedon other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); Hewlett Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425
F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), a'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978); Azzaro v. Harnett, 414 F.
Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aft'd, 553 F.2d 93 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
112. 29 U.S.C. § l144(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1975). The effect of this preemption may be to
remove some restrictive state laws as obstacles to insurer innovation. But see notes 113-14 infra
and accompanying text.
113. See Wayne Chemical, Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D.
Ind. 1977). The court held that state law, even though preempted by ERISA, could be utilized
when compatible with the federal law and could be adopted as the federal rule of decision. The
case dealt with the convertibility provision of an insurance policy, an area not directly covered by
the substantive provisions of ERISA. Id.
114. Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921, 926 (D. Minn. 1976). See
also Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F. Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977). In its opinion, the
Hamberlin court, faced with the question of whether a trust established by entrepreneurs for the
purpose of marketing insurance products and services was subject to ERISA rather than state
insurance regulation, stated: "They [the plans under consideration by the court] are no more ER-
ISA plans than i any other insurancepolicy sold to an employee beneft plan." Id. at 1199 (quoting
HOusE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, AcTIVrry REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 94-1785, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 48 (1977)) (emphasis added by court). This interpretation means that while ERISA does not
add obstacles to an insurer's ability to vary coverages, it is unlikely to remove any state regulations
on coverages.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976).
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tivities are exempt. 16 By means of an exception to this exemption, the
Sherman Act is specifically made applicable to attempts of boycott, co-
ercion or intimidation by insurers." 7 If an insurer's cost containment
activities fall within the protection of the McCarran Act, no Sherman
Act sanctions can be invoked. However, these activities still would re-
main subject to state unfair competitive practices statutes, which often
closely parallel or are even more extensive than their federal counter-
parts.1
8
Should an insurer find itself outside the exemption of the McCar-
ran Act, this does not mean that the insurer's cost containment prac-
tices automatically fall within the proscriptions of the antitrust laws.
Where sufficient competition exists in the insurance market, an insurer
can act individually to implement cost control measures without fear-
ing antitrust problems. An insurer that is able to gain a competitive
advantage by meeting a market demand better than competitors is only
reaping the fruits of the competition that antitrust is designed to pro-
tect."19
Collective action by insurers presents a more difficult analysis, but
not one that warrants automatic antitrust condemnation. Some areas of
insurer cooperation are allowed so long as they do not pose restraints
on competition. For example, the exchange of cost and price informa-
tion involved in rate making may, in a competitive market, be viewed
as a means of fostering, rather than suppressing, competition and may
therefore be in the public interest. 2° Whether viewed as data dissemi-
nation activity by a trade association12 1 or as a joint venture, 122 insurer
cooperation in certain areas could be structured so that it would not
116. Any analysis of the scope of the McCarran Act exemption revolves around three basic
issues: whether the innovation is part of the "business of insurance"; whether the state has a suffi-
cient framework for regulating such activity and what the effects of its regulation will be; and
whether the innovation involves a boycott, coercion or intimidation. See Kallstrom, supra note
31, at 684-89 and Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act'rAntitrust Exemption for Insurance: Lan-
guage, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587 for a discussion of these issues.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976).
118. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1032 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
119. The possible opportunity to enjoy a superior market position is the driving force behind
product innovation. Absent monopoly power and an intent to monopolize, an insurer's activities
should not be found illegal. Such activities would not constitute "the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of
a superior product, business acumen, or historical accident." United States v. Grinell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
120. Maple Flooring Mfr. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1925). For guidelines
of the conditions favorable to an exchange of information with minimal antitrust risks, see U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRICING AND MARKETING OF INSURANCE 116 (1977).
121. See generaly U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 120, at 99-118.
122. Id 119-45.
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violate federal antitrust laws. A different result, however, occurs where
insurers agree to fix premium levels in their own market.123 Problems
also may arise where such collective action by insurers gives them mo-
nopsony power in purchasing medical services from providers. 2 4
The actual methods that insurers use to implement cost contain-
ment strategies must also be examined for possible antitrust violations.
Where price fixing is not directed toward the insurer's own market, but
toward the health care market, antitrust problems may be avoided
under the ancillary restraint doctrine.'25 An insurer may need to pro-
tect its use of a provider reimbursement schedule from the price fixing
contamination that might occur where providers have collectively
agreed to the rates of reimbursement that the schedule contains.'
2 6
Some type of provider panel arrangement may be a necessary condi-
tion of insurance coverage for an insurer to effectively control both util-
ization and cost. The antitrust difficulties in the panel approach do not
appear to be as much of a legal obstacle as the corporate practice of
medicine or Blue Shield laws.127 An insurer may even be able to avoid
any problems involving discriminatory treatment of providers by utiliz-
ing policy provisions that allow free choice of physicians but contain
incentives for the insured to utilize insurer-sponsored panels. 128 As in-
surers investigate alternative courses for effectuating their cost contain-
ment strategies, careful planning can prevent violations of both state
and federal statutes aimed at preventing anticompetitive activities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although commercial insurers have traditionally not assumed an
active role in controlling costs of health care services, current condi-
tions in the market environment make it prudent for insurers to
reevaluate their position. Extreme inflation in the health care sector
has increased consumer awareness and demand for cost containment,
making it probable that the government will intervene if the private
sector does not furnish relief. The prevalence of employer-purchased
123. Cooperation by commercial insurers is likely to be viewed as anticompetitive activity,
and if the combination is found either directly or indirectly to result in price fixing, such coopera-
tion may be considered illegal per se under the Sherman Act. Id 91-97. Since the collective price
setting by insurers might be enforced by collective refusals to deal with noncooperative providers
and because states do not actively regulate health insurance rates, the McCarran exemption would
probably not apply.
124. Havighurst, supra note 34, at 328-34.
125. Kallstrom, supra note 31, at 659-65.
126. Id 678-84.
127. See text accompanying notes 50-83 supra.
128. See Havighurst, supra note 34, at 330-31. This may also avoid problems with some
mandatory policy provisions. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
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insurance will provide an initial market through which the benefits of
cost containment efforts may be realized.
By manipulating policy coverages, an insurer can promote innova-
tive delivery systems, the implementation of cost controls on existing
health services and renewed cost consciousness in the consumer of
medical services. While some of these methods are currently being
utilized, further innovations can provide a more effective curb on rising
health care costs.
Legal challenges will be raised against the innovative insurer who
assumes an active role in cost containment. One challenge facing
many cost control strategies is the rule against corporate practice of
medicine. So long as the insurer does not actively interfere with the
physician's professional judgment, however, this rule should no longer
be a barrier to the implementation of insurer-sponsored measures
aimed at cost reduction. Blue Shield laws may pose a problem in some
states, but their restrictive provisions can often be avoided through lib-
eral enforcement and interpretation, federal preemption, or constitu-
tional challenges. Mandatory policy provisions and coverages do
present restraints on some types of insurer innovation, but many cost
containment packages may be designed to avoid any conflict with these
state laws.
Besides structuring coverages to bypass statutory restrictions, the
insurer should also avoid policy provisions that courts will strike down
as unconscionable or that may not be construed literally. If adequate
precautions are taken by the insurer, the basic principles of contract
law should uphold coverage limitations. The effects of ERISA on in-
surer cost containment efforts will probably not pose any greater re-
strictions than those which exist under state law. Although antitrust
implications must also be considered for any cooperative cost contain-
ment efforts between insurers, an individual insurer's action that results
in cost controls in the medical industry should not violate antitrust
principles.
A valuable market opportunity awaits the innovative insurer who
can effectively combine the financing function with the cost contain-
ment function in the health care sector. Legal restraints normally can
be circumvented or overcome, and careful leadership, planning and co-
operation among employers, labor, providers and insurers can pave the
way to avoid adverse market reaction.12 9 In any dynamic market envi-
129. Leadership and cooperation among employers, labor, providers and insurers have been
key factors in the success of the Twin-Cities Healthcare Development Project in Minneapolis.
Inlation of Health Care Costs: Hearings, supra note 4, at 790-91.
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ronment, a stagnant firm dies; an adaptive firm survives; an innovative
firm prospers.
